

On the Presburger fragment of logics with multiteam semantics

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Statistical Dependencies

Team semantics is based on **sets** (of assignments), hence statements such as $x \perp y$ “ x is independent of y ” are defined on the **presence** or **absence** of data, not on their **multiplicity**.

The table \mathcal{T} lists temperature measurements between 0° and 40° in different countries.

Country	Temperature	Date
	40°	25.07.19
	32°	26.06.19
	40°	07.07.20
	2°	08.02.20
\vdots	\vdots	\vdots

In team semantics, $\mathcal{T} \models \text{Country} \perp \text{Temperature}$.

Multiteams

Approach: extend teams $X = \{s_1: x \mapsto a, s_2: x \mapsto b\}$ to finite multiteams $M = \{\{s_1, s_1, s_2\}\}$ in which the information of the **multiplicity** of the assignments is present.

Formally, $X = \{s: \mathcal{V} \rightarrow A\}$ becomes $M = (X, n: X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_{>0})$.

Support $M^T = X$

Union $\{\{s_1, s_2\}\} \uplus \{\{s_1\}\} = M$

Subset $\{\{s_1\}\} \sqsubseteq \{\{s_1, s_2\}\}$

Probability $\Pr_M(x = a) = 2/3$

Universal extension

For $A = \{a, b\}$

	x	y
	a	a
	a	b
$M[y \mapsto a]$ is	a	a
	a	b
	b	a
	b	b

Skolem extension

$F: M \rightarrow A$ assigns every $s \in M$ an element of A .

	x	y
	a	a
	a	b
$M[y \mapsto F]$ is	a	a
	a	b
	b	b

Statistical dependencies

Dependence $M \models \text{dep}(\bar{x}, y)$ if $M^T \models \text{dep}(\bar{x}, y)$

Independence $M \models \bar{x} \perp\!\!\!\perp \bar{y}$ if $\Pr_M(\bar{x} = \bar{a}) = \Pr_M(\bar{x} = \bar{a} \mid \bar{y} = \bar{b})$
holds for all $\bar{a} \in M(\bar{x})^T$ and $\bar{b} \in M(\bar{y})^T$

In particular $\mathcal{T} \not\models \text{Country} \perp\!\!\!\perp \text{Temperature}$

Inclusion $M \models x \subseteq y$ if $M(x) \subseteq M(y)$

Because M is finite, $x \subseteq y \equiv y \subseteq x$.

First-order multiteam semantics

$\text{FO}^M[\Omega]$ is the closure of atomic **multiteam** dependencies Ω under first-order connectives.

- $\mathfrak{A} \models_M \lambda$ if $\mathfrak{A} \models \lambda[s]$ for all $s \in M^T$ if λ is a first-order literal
- $\mathfrak{A} \models_M \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ if $\mathfrak{A} \models_M \varphi_i$ for $i = 1, 2$
- $\mathfrak{A} \models_M \varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$ if $\mathfrak{A} \models_{R_i} \varphi_i$ for some $R_1 \uplus R_2 = M$
- $\mathfrak{A} \models_M \forall x \varphi$ if $\mathfrak{A} \models_{M[x \mapsto A]} \varphi$
- $\mathfrak{A} \models_M \exists x \varphi$ if $\mathfrak{A} \models_{M[x \mapsto F]} \varphi$ for some $F: M \rightarrow A$

Relationship of logics with multiteam semantics

Under multiteam semantics dependence is **downwards closed** and inclusion is **union closed**.

It is also possible to express **dependence** $\text{dep}(\bar{x}, y)$ / **exclusion** and **inclusion** $\bar{x} \sqsubseteq \bar{y}$ in $\text{FO}^M[\perp\!\!\!\perp]$.


Theorem

Let $\bar{\alpha}$ be any collection of **downwards closed** atomic formulae and $\bar{\beta}$ be any collection of **union closed** atomic formulae. There is no formula $\psi \in \text{FO}^M[\bar{\alpha}, \bar{\beta}]$ equivalent to $x \perp\!\!\!\perp y$.

Hence $\text{FO}^M[\sqsubseteq, \perp\!\!\!\perp] \not\equiv \text{FO}^M[\perp\!\!\!\perp]$.

Metafinite structures

The basis is a **finite** structure \mathfrak{A} and an **infinite** number sort here: $\mathfrak{N} = (\mathbb{N}, +, \cdot, 0, 1, \Sigma)$, where Σ maps multisets of numbers to their sum. **Weight functions** $w: A^k \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ mapping tuples of elements of \mathfrak{A} into \mathfrak{N} connect the finite and infinite part.



Here: $\mathfrak{D} = (\mathfrak{A}, \mathfrak{N}, \{f_M\})$ where $f_M: A^k \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ encodes a multiteam M ; $f_M(\bar{a})$ is the multiplicity of $s: \bar{x} \mapsto \bar{a}$ in M .

Existential second-order logic for multiteams

First-order part $\text{FO}^{\text{mts}}[+, \cdot]$:

$$\begin{aligned} t &::= 0 \mid f\bar{x} \mid t + t \mid t \cdot t \mid \Sigma_{\bar{x}}\{t : \alpha\} \\ \varphi &::= \alpha \mid t = t \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \exists \mathbf{x}\varphi \mid \forall \mathbf{x}\varphi \end{aligned}$$

Plus second-order quantification results in $\text{ESO}^{\text{mts}}[+, \cdot]$:

$$\psi(f) = (\exists g_1 \triangleleft b_1) \dots (\exists g_k \triangleleft b_k) \varphi$$

where b_i are **bounds** of the form $|f| \cdot |A|^\ell$.

$\mathcal{D} = (\mathcal{A}, \mathfrak{N}, \{f_M\}) \models (\exists g \triangleleft b) \varphi$ if $(\mathcal{A}, \mathfrak{N}, \{f_M, g\}) \models \varphi$ for some $g: A^k \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ with $|g| = \sum_{\bar{a}} g(\bar{a}) \leq |f| \cdot |A|^\ell$.

The **Presburger fragment** $\text{ESO}^{\text{mts}}[+]$ of $\text{ESO}^{\text{mts}}[+, \cdot]$ uses only addition and summation.

$$\text{FO}^M[\underline{\exists}, |] \equiv \text{ESO}^{\text{mts}}[+]$$

Theorem

For every $\varphi(\bar{x}) \in \text{FO}^M[\underline{\exists}, |]$ there exists $\psi(f) \in \text{ESO}^{\text{mts}}[+]$, such that

$$\mathfrak{A} \models_M \varphi \text{ if, and only if, } (\mathfrak{A}, \mathfrak{N}, \{f_M\}) \models \psi(f).$$

Theorem

For every $\psi(f) \in \text{ESO}^{\text{mts}}[+]$, such that $\psi(0) \equiv \text{true}$, there exists $\varphi \in \text{FO}^M[\underline{\exists}, |]$ such that

$$\mathfrak{A} \models_M \varphi \text{ if, and only if, } (\mathfrak{A}, \mathfrak{N}, \{f_M\}) \models \psi(f).$$

Forking

Forking, e.g. $x \triangleleft_{\geq \lambda} y$, has been studied for team semantics in context of two-sorted structures by [Grädel and Hegselmann \(2016\)](#).

Under multiteam semantics: $\mathfrak{A} \models_M \bar{x} \triangleleft_{\triangleleft p} \bar{y}$ if

$\Pr_M(\bar{y} = \bar{b} \mid \bar{x} = \bar{a}) \triangleleft p$ holds for all tuples $\bar{a}, \bar{b} \in A^*$ for which $\Pr_M(\bar{y} = \bar{b} \mid \bar{x} = \bar{a}) > 0$ where $\triangleleft \in \{\leq, =, \geq\}$ and $p \in [0, 1]$.

Special cases:

- $\bar{x} \triangleleft_{\leq 0} \bar{y} \equiv \text{false}$ and $\bar{x} \triangleleft_{\geq 0} \bar{y} \equiv \text{true}$.
- $\bar{x} \triangleleft_{\geq p} \bar{y} \equiv \text{dep}(\bar{x}, \bar{y})$ for any $p > 1/2$

Closure properties:

- 1 $\bar{x} \triangleleft_{\leq p} \bar{y}$ is union closed
- 2 $\bar{x} \triangleleft_{=p} \bar{y}$ and $\bar{x} \triangleleft_{\geq p}$ are neither downwards closed nor union closed

Forking $_{\geq}$

$$M = \begin{array}{cc} \frac{x}{a} & \frac{y}{a} \\ a & a \\ a & a \\ a & b \\ a & b \\ b & b \end{array} \text{ satisfies } x \triangleleft_{\geq 1/2} y, \text{ but } \begin{array}{cc} \frac{x}{a} & \frac{y}{a} \\ a & a \\ a & a \\ a & b \\ b & b \end{array} \notin M \text{ does not.}$$

Hence $\bar{x} \triangleleft_{\geq p} \bar{y}$ is not downwards closed.

But $\bar{x} \triangleleft_{\geq p} \bar{y}$ is downwards closed in the team semantical sense:
 If $(X, m) \models \bar{x} \triangleleft_{\geq p} \bar{y}$ then $(Y, m \upharpoonright Y) \models \bar{x} \triangleleft_{\geq p} \bar{y}$ for all $Y \subseteq X$.

Fact: $\text{FO}^M[\text{dep}] \not\preceq \text{FO}^M[\triangleleft_{\geq 1/2}]$.

Forking $_{\leq}$ & anonymity


The atom $\bar{x} \triangleleft_{\leq p} \bar{y}$ is similar to **anonymity** $x \Upsilon y$ introduced by **Väänänen** in team semantics: “given x one cannot determine the value of y ”.

In particular, $\mathfrak{A} \models_{(x,n)} x \triangleleft_{\leq 1/2} y$ implies $\mathfrak{A} \models_x x \Upsilon y$.

Facts:

- $\text{FO}^M[\triangleleft_{\leq 1/2}] \equiv \text{FO}^M[\trianglelefteq]$
- $\text{FO}^M[\triangleleft_{\leq p}]$ and $\text{FO}^M[\triangleleft_{\geq p}]$ are incomparable
- $\text{FO}^M[\triangleleft_{\leq 1/2}, \triangleleft_{\geq 1/2}] \equiv \text{FO}^M[\triangleleft_{=1/2}] \equiv \text{ESO}^{\text{mts}}[+]$

Overview



flat, (team semantically) downwards closed, union closed