



# Finite information logic

Rohit Parikh<sup>a,\*</sup>, Jouko Väänänen<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>City University of New York, Brooklyn College and CUNY Graduate Center, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016, USA

<sup>b</sup>Department of Mathematics, University of Helsinki, Finland

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## Abstract

We introduce a generalization of *Independence Friendly (IF)* logic in which Eloise (the  $\exists$  player) is restricted to a finite amount of information about Abelard's ( $\forall$ 's) moves. This logic is shown to be equivalent to a sublogic  $\exists\forall$  of first-order logic, to have the finite model property, and to be decidable. Moreover, it gives an exponential compression relative to  $\exists\forall$  logic.

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## 1. Introduction

We start by introducing Partial Information logic (PI) which is a generalization of both first-order logic and Hintikka–Sandu [5] IF-logic. We motivate this logic by means of an example. Suppose we have a model  $\mathcal{M}$  on some domain  $D$  and some formula  $A = (\forall x)(\forall y)(\exists z)R(x, y, z)$  where  $R$  is atomic. Then to this formula corresponds a game between two players Abelard and Eloise. Abelard chooses two elements  $a, b$  from  $D$ . Then Eloise chooses a third element  $c$  from  $D$ . If the formula  $R(a, b, c)$  holds in  $\mathcal{M}$  then Eloise has won, else Abelard has. Now it can be shown that the formula  $A$  is *true* in  $\mathcal{M}$  iff Eloise has a winning strategy.

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\* Corresponding author.

*E-mail addresses:* [ripbc@cunyvm.cuny.edu](mailto:ripbc@cunyvm.cuny.edu) (R. Parikh), [jouko.vaananen@helsinki.fi](mailto:jouko.vaananen@helsinki.fi) (J. Väänänen).

The game that we have just described tells us how *classical* first-order logic works. To look at IF-logic we consider a slight variant. Let  $B$  be the variant of  $A$  obtained by writing  $B = (\forall x)(\forall y)(\exists z/x)R(x, y, z)$ . Now the game proceeds as before with Abelard choosing  $a, b$  and Eloise choosing  $c$ , but now the choice of  $c$  has to be *independent* of  $a$  because the quantifier  $\exists z$  has now been marked by a  $/x$ , indicating independence of  $x$ , or, as we might say, *ignorance* of  $x$ .

But, instead of talking about ignorance, we could speak about knowledge, and we could just as easily say that Eloise’s knowledge is restricted to the value of  $y$ , i.e. to  $b$ . Instead of concentrating on what Eloise does *not* know we concentrate on what she *does* know. Similar restrictions might of course apply to Abelard in the case where he too has a move which follows the move of Eloise. (However, since we shall define the semantics in terms of the winning strategy of Eloise, it will turn out that the restrictions on Abelard do not enter into the semantics. To be sure of winning, Eloise must allow the possibility that Abelard makes a good move by luck.)

Now we introduce an innovation which will turn out to be interesting. IF-logic allows Eloise to know the value of  $x$ , or of  $y$  or of both or neither. Could we consider other possibilities? For example, suppose  $x, y$  are integers. We might restrict Eloise to knowing the value of their *sum*, but not  $x, y$  themselves. Or for another, real life example, suppose you meet on the airplane an attractive woman who tells you only her first name (until she knows you better). Now if  $x$  is the name variable whose value is Eloise Dzhugashvili and she only tells you “Eloise”, then you do not know  $x$  but neither are you completely ignorant of it. You know it *in part*.

This opens up the possibility of directly expressing more general kinds of knowledge of the values of variables than are allowed by the syntax of IF-logic and we will see that it leads to interesting possibilities.

## 2. Partial Information logic, PI

As usual we have variables, predicate symbols, and certain special function symbols. Atomic formulas are defined as usual. Literals are atomic formulas or their negations. For simplicity we will apply negation only to atoms.

**Definition 1.** 1. Literals are formulas of PI.

2a. If  $\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  is a formula of PI and  $f$  is one of the special function symbols, then

$(\exists y \parallel_{f(\vec{x})})\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  is a formula of PI.

2b. If  $\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  is a formula of PI and  $f$  is one of the special function symbols,

then  $(\forall y \parallel_{f(\vec{x})})\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  is a formula of PI.

3a. If  $\varphi(\vec{x}), \theta(\vec{x})$  are formulas of PI then  $\varphi(\vec{x}) \vee \parallel_{f(\vec{x})}\theta(\vec{x})$  is a formula of PI.

3b. If  $\varphi(\vec{x}), \theta(\vec{x})$  are formulas of PI then  $\varphi(\vec{x}) \wedge \parallel_{f(\vec{x})}\theta(\vec{x})$  is a formula of PI.

Intuitively, the  $\exists y$  in  $(\exists y \parallel_{f(\vec{x})})\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  is Eloise’s move but because of the restriction  $\parallel_{f(\vec{x})}$  she only knows  $f(\vec{x})$  when she makes her move. We may, more generally,

allow her also to know the values of two or more functions  $f, g$  of  $\vec{x}$  so that in the extreme case she could know all the projection functions and hence know  $\vec{x}$  precisely. That case corresponds to our usual first-order logic. In an intermediate case, she could know *some* of the projection functions on  $\vec{x}$ , i.e. some but not all of the variables in  $\vec{x}$ . That case corresponds to IF-logic.

In  $(\forall y \parallel_{f(\vec{x})})\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  the move is Abelard's and he too is restricted in a similar way. (However, this restriction will not affect the semantics which depends only on the winning strategies of Eloise.)

Let us consider  $\varphi(\vec{x}) \vee \parallel_{f(\vec{x})}\theta(\vec{x})$ . Since we have a disjunction here, it is for Eloise to choose which of the two formulas  $\varphi, \theta$  to play. But when she chooses, she only knows the value  $f(\vec{x})$  or perhaps more than one such value, but her knowledge of  $\vec{x}$  might not be complete.

On the other hand, in  $\varphi(\vec{x}) \wedge \parallel_{f(\vec{x})}\theta(\vec{x})$  the move is Abelard's but the restrictions are similar to those in 3a above. Intuitively, a closed formula  $\phi$  is true in a structure just in the case where Eloise has a winning strategy which uses only what she knows.

Compositional semantics can be defined for PI in just the same way as they have been defined for IF-logic by Hodges [6,7], Väänänen [12], etc. The details will appear elsewhere. Moreover PI-logic can be interpreted into second-order logic in the same way. Refs. [8,11,1,9] give a game theoretic interpretation of various logics, including classical and intuitionistic (but not IF-logic).

Now we come to a special kind of PI-logic where the special functions  $f$  allow only a *finite* amount of information about the arguments. Thus if  $a, b$  are integers and Eloise has to make a choice based on them, she might be allowed only to know whether  $a < b$  or whether  $a + b$  is odd, or whatever. Knowing the precise value of  $a, b$  or even of  $a + b$  is out of the question.

Why consider such a restricted case? We have two reasons. One is that this special case of PI-logic which we shall call FI-logic, or *finite information logic*, has very elegant logical properties. The other is that since quantifiers correspond to moves in games, the games which FI-logic represents arise all the time in social algorithms and are deeply related to how social human interactions work.

For example, a passport official at an airport only wants to know whether you have a valid visa or not. If you do, she lets you in; if not, she sends you back on the next flight. Or perhaps she classifies you among four classes, those who are citizens, those who come from friendly countries whose citizens do not require a visa, those who have a visa, and the remainder who are the ones sent back. In any case she only wants a finite amount of information about the variable, namely you.

Or a young man looking for a date might want to know if the prospective date is blonde or brunette. If she is blonde, he is not interested, he wants to date brunettes only. If she does have dark hair, he wants to know whether she is tall. If not, he is again not interested. So he seeks a finite amount of information about the prospective date. Naturally she may have similar questions about him. But each will seek only a finite amount of information.

We repeat the definitions which we had above for formulas of PI-logic, indicating where the difference arises between PI-logic in general and its special case, FI. Since only a finite

amount of information is available at each step, it could easily be represented by one or more Booleans, i.e. by formulas. Thus our special functions  $f$  drop out. Our main result is [Theorem 11](#) which says that every consistent FI-sentence has a finite model. We use a strong form of this result to show that FI is exactly the existential–universal fragment of first-order logic, if considered as a classical logic. However, FI is actually a non-classical logic with a rich, many-valued semantics (this aspect will not be pursued in this paper). The reduction to first-order logic is non-trivial in the sense that there is a trade-off: an  $\exists \forall$  expression can be exponentially longer than its FI representation.

### 3. Basic definitions

Before we formally define the *Finite Information logic* FI in [Definitions 3](#) and [4](#) and discuss its semantics it makes sense to pay attention to the kind of  $\theta$  that we allow in  $\Vdash_\theta$ , as the following informal result demonstrates:

**Lemma 2.** *The following conditions are equivalent in any model  $\mathfrak{A}$  with at least two elements, whatever sentence  $\theta$  is:*

- (1)  $\mathfrak{A} \models (\forall x)(\exists y \Vdash_{(x=c \vee \theta)})(y \neq x)$ .
- (2)  $\mathfrak{A} \models \neg\theta$ .

**Proof.** Let  $\mathfrak{A}$  have two elements  $c, d$  (and perhaps others). Suppose that  $\theta$  is true. Then the information that  $(x = c \vee \theta)$  is true tells  $\exists$  nothing about  $x$ . Also the information that  $(x = c \vee \theta)$  is false tells  $\exists$  nothing because this information is impossible, i.e. never given in this case. Thus in this case  $y$  has to be chosen completely independently of  $x$  and  $\exists$  cannot possibly have a winning strategy for choosing  $y \neq x$ .

On the other hand, suppose that  $\theta$  is false (and  $\exists$  knows it). Then she can make the following inference: If I am told that  $(x = c \vee \theta)$  is true, I know that it is true because  $x = c$ , and then I know what  $x$  is. So I can choose  $y = d$ . If I am told that  $(x = c \vee \theta)$  is false, I know it is because  $x \neq c$ , and I can choose  $y = c$ . Thus  $\exists$  can use the strategy: choose  $y = d$  if  $\theta$  is true and  $y = c$  otherwise.  $\square$

In the proof we used the assumption that although the information that  $\exists$  has is limited as to the values of the variables,  $\exists$  can act as if she knows “generally known” things. For example, it follows that if  $\exists$  has a winning strategy, she knows what it is. Also, if it is known that  $\neg\theta$  (in a given model), then  $\exists$  knows it too. But this is only metaphorical. Clearly if there is a strategy which works because certain sentences are true, then  $\exists$  can play it and does not need to “know” that these sentences are true. In other words, the semantics only requires that Eloise *have* a winning strategy (but using only the information that she has) and does not require her to know why it is a winning strategy.

[Lemma 2](#) shows that if we allow  $\theta$  in  $\Vdash_\theta$ , we end up having a formula equivalent to the negation of  $\theta$  in our language. However, games of imperfect information may very well be non-determined. Therefore we should be cautious with operations that bring in negation. Moreover, we cannot allow Eloise to use as her “information source” more complex formulas than we want to have in the logic itself. A priori we could let  $\theta$  in  $\exists x \Vdash_\theta$  be any first-order formula, but [Lemma 2](#) tells us that then we would get a logic which

is at least as powerful as first-order logic and we would lose the finite model property and decidability.

In social software [10] it seems that the information we use in decisions is often atomic (“man”, “woman”) or existential (“has a ticket”, “has a visa, which is valid”) or Boolean combinations of such (“is retired or has a serious defect in vision”). Accordingly we start by allowing  $\theta$  in  $\parallel_{\theta}$  to be any Boolean combination of existential formulas.

**Definition 3.** The set of formulas of FI is defined as follows:

- (1) Atomic and negated atomic formulas are FI-formulas. (We do not allow function symbols.)
- (2) If  $\varphi(\vec{x})$  and  $\psi(\vec{x})$  are FI-formulas and  $\theta(\vec{x})$  is a Boolean combination of existential formulas, then

$$\varphi(\vec{x}) \wedge \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})} \psi(\vec{x})$$

and

$$\varphi(\vec{x}) \vee \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})} \psi(\vec{x})$$

are FI-formulas.

- (3) If  $\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  is an FI-formula and  $\theta(\vec{x})$  is a Boolean combination of existential formulas, then

$$(\forall y \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})}) \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$$

and

$$(\exists y \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})}) \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$$

are FI-formulas.

We have already given an intuitive explanation of the semantics of FI. We now define a more formal semantics for FI. Let us use  $V$  to denote the set of all variables. Suppose  $\mathfrak{A}$  is a model with domain  $A$ , and  $X$  is a set of functions  $s$  such that

- (1)  $\text{dom}(s) \subset V$  is a finite set of variables,
- (2)  $s, s' \in X \implies \text{dom}(s) = \text{dom}(s')$ ,
- (3)  $\text{ran}(s) \subseteq A$ .

Intuitively  $X$  is a set of plays, i.e., assignments of values to variables. To incorporate partial information we have to consider sets of plays rather than mere individual plays. A partition  $X = X_0 \cup X_1$  is  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -**homogeneous**, where  $\theta(\vec{x})$  is first order, if for all  $s, s' \in X$

$$(\mathfrak{A} \models_s \theta(\vec{x}) \iff \mathfrak{A} \models_{s'} \theta(\vec{x})) \implies (s \in X_0 \iff s' \in X_0).$$

Let

$$X[a : y] = \{(s \setminus \{\langle y, b \rangle : b \in A\}) \cup \{\langle y, a \rangle\} : s \in X\}$$

$$X[A : y] = \{s \cup \{\langle y, a \rangle\} : s \in X, a \in A\}.$$

We define the concept

$$\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi$$

for  $\varphi \in FI$  as follows:

- Definition 4.** (S1)  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi$  iff  $\mathfrak{A} \models_s \varphi$  for all  $s \in X$ , if  $\varphi$  is atomic or negated atomic.  
(S2)  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi(\vec{x}) \wedge \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})} \psi(\vec{x})$  iff  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi(\vec{x})$  and  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \psi(\vec{x})$ . ( $\theta(\vec{x})$  plays no role)  
(S3)  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi(\vec{x}) \vee \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})} \psi(\vec{x})$  iff there is a  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous partition  $X = X_0 \cup X_1$ , such that  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0} \varphi(\vec{x})$  and  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_1} \psi(\vec{x})$ .  
(S4)  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X (\exists y \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})}) \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  iff there is a  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous partition  $X = X_0 \cup X_1$ , and  $a_0, a_1$  such that  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0[a_0:y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  and  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_1[a_1:y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ .  
(S5)  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X (\forall y \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})}) \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  iff

$$\mathfrak{A} \models_{X[A:y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$$

( $\theta(\vec{x})$  plays no role).

There is an asymmetry between  $\wedge \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})}$  and  $\vee \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})}$  on one hand and between  $(\forall y \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})})$  and  $(\exists y \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})})$  on the other hand. This is because in this paper we consider truth from the point of view of  $\exists$  only, i.e. “classically”. Thus we are concerned about the knowledge that  $\exists$  has. As  $\exists$  has to be prepared to play against all strategies of  $\forall$ ,  $\exists$  has to consider also the case that  $\forall$  plays “accidentally” with perfect information. If we considered FI “non-classically” the symmetry would be preserved.

**Lemma 5.** Suppose  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{\{\emptyset\}} \varphi$ . Then  $\exists$  has a winning strategy in the obvious semantic game, namely, while  $\exists$  plays, she keeps  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi$  and “the play is in  $X$ ” remains true.

- Proof.** (G1) Suppose we are at an atomic or negated atomic formula  $\varphi$ . Since  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi$  and the play is in  $X$ ,  $\exists$  wins by (S1).  
(G2) We are at  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi(\vec{x}) \wedge \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})} \psi(\vec{x})$ . Now  $\forall$  plays choosing, say,  $\varphi(\vec{x})$ . We use (S2) to conclude that  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi(\vec{x})$ .  
(G3) We are at  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi(\vec{x}) \vee \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})} \psi(\vec{x})$ . We can by (S3) divide  $X = X_0 \cup X_1$  in a  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous way such that  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0} \varphi(\vec{x})$  and  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_1} \psi(\vec{x})$ . The play is in  $X$  so it is in one of  $X_0$  and  $X_1$ , but  $\exists$  does not know in which. We let  $\exists$  make the choice on the basis of the following inference. If  $\theta(\vec{x})$  is true and some  $\vec{x}'$  in  $X_0$  satisfies  $\theta(\vec{x}')$ , then she chooses  $X_0$ . In this case homogeneity gives that the play is in  $X_0$  and we also have  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0} \varphi(\vec{x})$ . If  $\theta(\vec{x})$  is true and some  $\vec{x}'$  in  $X_1$  satisfies  $\theta(\vec{x}')$ , then she chooses  $X_1$ . Again homogeneity gives that the play is in  $X_1$  and we also have  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_1} \varphi(\vec{x})$ . Similarly, if  $\theta(\vec{x})$  is false and some  $\vec{x}'$  in  $X_0$  satisfies  $\theta(\vec{x}')$ , then she chooses  $X_1$ , otherwise  $X_0$ .  
(G4) We are at  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X (\forall y \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})}) \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ .  $\exists$  knows  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X[A:y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  and the play so far is in  $X$ . Whatever  $\forall$  plays, the play is in  $X[A : y]$ .  
(G5) We are at  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X (\exists y \parallel_{\theta(\vec{x})}) \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ . There is a  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous partition  $X = X_0 \cup X_1$ , and  $a_0, a_1$  such that  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0[a_0:y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  and  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_1[a_1:y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ . As in the case of disjunction, player  $\exists$  chooses  $a_0$  or  $a_1$  according to whether some  $\vec{x}'$  in  $X_0$  satisfies  $\theta(\vec{x}')$  or not.  $\square$

**Examples 6.** 1°  $(\forall x \parallel) (\exists y \parallel_{P(x)}) (x = y)$  says that both  $P$  and its complement have at most one element.

2°  $(\forall x \parallel) (\exists y \parallel_{P(x)}) (x \neq y)$  says that both  $P$  and its complement are non-empty.

For instance, in 2°, if both  $P$  and its complement are non-empty, then knowing the truth value of  $P(x)$ ,  $\exists$  can choose a  $y$  such that  $P(y)$  has the opposite truth value. But this strategy (or any other) will not be available to her if either  $P$  or its complement is empty.

**Lemma 7.** *If  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi$  and  $X_0 \subseteq X$ , then  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0} \varphi$ .*

**Proof.** Immediate from the definition by induction on  $\varphi$ .  $\square$

#### 4. The finite model property

**Lemma 8.** *Every FI-sentence is equivalent to a first-order sentence (i.e. holds in the same models).*

**Proof.** Suppose  $\phi \in FI$ . Let  $n$  be the length of  $\phi$ . It suffices to show that if  $M \models \phi$  and player II has a winning strategy in the  $n$ -move Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game [2,4] on  $M$  and  $M'$ , then  $M' \models \phi$ . Suppose  $X$  is a set of interpretations of a set  $V$  of variables in  $M$  and  $\Pi = \{\pi_s : s \in X\}$  is a set of partial isomorphisms  $M \rightarrow M'$  such that  $\text{ran}(s) = \text{dom}(\pi_s)$  for  $s \in X$ . Then  $\Pi \circ X = \{\pi_s \circ s : s \in X\}$  is a set of interpretations in  $M'$  of the variables in  $V$ . We write  $X' = \Pi \circ X$ . Let us assume that player II has a winning strategy in the Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game on  $M$  and  $M'$  of  $n$  rounds. The different plays of this game, player II following her winning strategy, form in a natural way a tree  $T$ . If  $t$  is a node of height  $i$  of the tree  $T$ , that is, a play of  $i$  rounds, we denote by  $s_t$  the interpretation this play gives in  $M$  to the variables  $x_1, \dots, x_i$ .  $s'_t$  is the corresponding interpretation given in  $M'$  to the variables  $x_1, \dots, x_i$ . Since player II is playing a winning strategy, the mapping  $s_t(x_j) \mapsto s'_t(x_j)$  is a partial isomorphism  $M \rightarrow M'$ . If  $T'$  is a subtree of  $T$ , let  $X_i(T')$  be a set of all  $s_t$  for  $t$  in  $T'$  of height  $i$ . Let  $X'_i(T')$  be the corresponding set of  $s'_t$ .

**Claim.** *For all subtrees  $T'$  of  $T$ :  $M \models_{X_i(T')} \phi(x_1, \dots, x_i) \iff M' \models_{X'_i(T')} \phi(x_1, \dots, x_i)$  for  $\phi(x_1, \dots, x_i)$  of quantifier rank  $\leq n - i$ .*

The proof of the claim goes by induction on  $\phi$ . The cases of atomic formulas and conjunctions are trivial. For disjunction and existential quantifier it suffices to notice that if  $X_i(T') = X_i(T_0) \cup X_i(T_1)$  is a  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous partition, then  $X'_i(T') = X'_i(T_0) \cup X'_i(T_1)$  is again a  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous partition. For this  $\theta(\vec{x})$  need not be a Boolean combination of existential formulas as long as it is first order. For universal quantifier we let player I try all possible elements and apply the induction hypothesis to the resulting new subtree of  $T$ .  $\square$

Note that when we use the expression *FI* without any parameters, we intend that the information formulas  $\theta$  are Boolean combinations of existential formulas. However, we will also consider *FI(L)* where  $L$  is some other language, and in that case  $L$  will be shown explicitly.

Let *FI(FO)* denote the extension of *FI* where any first-order  $\theta$  is allowed to occur in  $\llbracket \theta \rrbracket$ .

**Lemma 2** implies that *FI(FO)* contains all of first-order logic.

**Corollary 9.**  *$FI(FO) = FO$ .*

A first-order formula is existential–universal  $\exists\forall$  if it is of the form

$$(\exists x_1) \dots (\exists x_n) (\forall y_1) \dots (\forall y_m) \varphi$$

where  $\varphi$  is quantifier-free. A formula is  $\Delta_2$  if it is equivalent to an  $\exists\forall$ -formula and its negation is too. An example of a  $\Delta_2$  formula is

$$(\exists x_1)(\exists x_2)(x_1 \neq x_2) \wedge (\forall x_1)(\forall x_2)(\forall x_3)(x_1 = x_2 \vee x_1 = x_3 \vee x_2 = x_3).$$

which says that there are exactly two elements. Boolean combinations of existential formulas (and of  $\Delta_2$  formulas) are, of course,  $\Delta_2$ .

**Lemma 10.** *The following conditions are equivalent for any first-order sentence  $\varphi$ :*

- (1)  $\varphi$  is equivalent to an  $\exists\forall$ -formula.
- (2) If  $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi$  and  $\mathfrak{A}$  is the union of a chain  $\mathfrak{A}_\alpha$  ( $\alpha < \beta$ ) of models, then there is an  $\alpha < \beta$  such that  $\mathfrak{A}_\alpha \models \varphi$ .
- (3) If  $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi$ , then there is a finite  $C \subseteq A$  such that for all  $\mathfrak{D}$  with  $C \subseteq D \subseteq A$  we have  $\mathfrak{D} \models \varphi$ .

**Proof.** Clearly (1)  $\rightarrow$  (3)  $\rightarrow$  (2). We prove (2)  $\rightarrow$  (1). By (2) the class of models of the sentence  $\neg\varphi$  is closed under unions of chains of models. By the Łoś–Suszko lemma,  $\neg\varphi$  is universal–existential, whence  $\varphi$  is equivalent to an  $\exists\forall$  formula.  $\square$

The following theorem also has an alternative proof which we give after [Theorem 16](#).

**Theorem 11.** *Every consistent FI-sentence has the finite model property.*

**Proof.** We prove condition (3) of [Lemma 10](#). We use induction on  $\varphi$  to prove (recall that  $V$  is the set of all variables):

- ( $\star$ ) If  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi$ , where  $X \subseteq {}^V A$ , then there is a finite  $A_0 = A_0(\mathfrak{A}, X, \varphi)$ , s.t. for all  $\mathfrak{A}_1 \subseteq \mathfrak{A}$  with  $A_0 \subseteq A_1 \subseteq A$  we have  $\mathfrak{A}_1 \models_{X \cap {}^V A_1} \varphi$ .
- (S1)  $\varphi$  is atomic or negated atomic. We can choose  $\mathfrak{A}_0$  to be any non-empty subset of  $A$ .
- (S2) Conjunction: We can let  $A_0(\mathfrak{A}, X, \varphi \wedge \psi) = A_0(\mathfrak{A}, X, \varphi) \cup A_0(\mathfrak{A}, X, \psi)$  and this clearly works.
- (S3) Disjunction: Suppose that  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi(\vec{x}) \vee_{\theta(\vec{x})} \psi(\vec{x})$ . Let  $X = X_0 \cup X_1$  be such that  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0} \varphi(\vec{x})$ ,  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_1} \psi(\vec{x})$  and the partition is  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous. Remember that  $\theta(\vec{x})$  is  $\Delta_2$ . Let  $\mathfrak{A}_1^*$  be finite, such that  $A_0(\mathfrak{A}, X, \varphi) \cup A_0(\mathfrak{A}, X, \psi) \subseteq \mathfrak{A}_1^* \subseteq \mathfrak{A}$  and  $\mathfrak{A}_1^* \subseteq \mathfrak{A}_2 \subseteq \mathfrak{A}$  implies for all  $s \in X$

$$\mathfrak{A}_2 \models_s \theta(\vec{x}) \iff \mathfrak{A} \models_s \theta(\vec{x}).$$

For such  $\mathfrak{A}_2$  we have  $\mathfrak{A}_2 \models_{X_0 \cap {}^V A_2} \varphi$  and  $\mathfrak{A}_2 \models_{X_1 \cap {}^V A_2} \psi$ . Moreover, the partition of  $X \cap {}^V A_2$  to  $X_0 \cap {}^V A_2$  and  $X_1 \cap {}^V A_2$  is clearly  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous.

- (S4) Universal quantification: Suppose  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X (\forall y)\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ . Thus  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X[A:y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ . Choose  $A_0 = A_0(\mathfrak{A}, X[A : y], \varphi(\vec{x}, y))$ . If  $\mathfrak{A}_1 \subseteq \mathfrak{A}$  with  $A_0 \subseteq A_1 \subseteq A$ , then  $X[A : y] \cap ({}^{V \cup \{y\}} A_1) = (X \cap {}^V A_1)[A_1 : y]$ , whence  $\mathfrak{A}_1 \models_X (\forall y)\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ .
- (S5) Existential quantification:  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X (\exists y)_{\theta(\vec{x})}\varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ . Let  $X = X_0 \cup X_1$  be  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous and  $a_0, a_1$  such that  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0[a_0:y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$  and  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_1[a_1:y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ . Remember that  $\theta(\vec{x})$  is  $\Delta_2$ . Let  $\mathfrak{A}_1^*$  be finite, such that  $A_0(\mathfrak{A}, X[a_0; y], \varphi(\vec{x}, y)) \cup$



$A_0(\mathfrak{A}, X[a_1; y], \varphi(\vec{x}, y)) \cup \{a_0, a_1\} \subseteq A_1^* \subseteq A$  and  $\mathfrak{A}_1^* \subseteq \mathfrak{A}_2 \subseteq \mathfrak{A}$  implies for all  $s \in X$

$$\mathfrak{A}_2 \models_s \theta(\vec{x}) \iff \mathfrak{A} \models_s \theta(\vec{x}).$$

For such  $\mathfrak{A}_2$  we have  $\mathfrak{A}_2 \models_{X \cap V_{A_2}} (\exists y //_{\theta(\vec{x})}) \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ . Why? Because  $X \cap V_{A_2} = (X_0 \cap V_{A_2}) \cup (X_1 \cap V_{A_2})$  is a  $\theta(\vec{x})$ -homogeneous partition in  $\mathfrak{A}_2$  and  $\mathfrak{A}_2 \models_{(X_0 \cap V_{A_2})[a_0; y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ ,  $\mathfrak{A}_2 \models_{(X_1 \cap V_{A_2})[a_1; y]} \varphi(\vec{x}, y)$ .  $\square$

The above theorem has an alternative proof using the concept of a D-structure (see [8,11,1,9], which are related to [3]).

**Example 12.** The sentence

$$(\forall x //) (\exists y //_{x=x}) (x \leq y)$$

(adjoined to the universal axioms for linear order) says that the linear order  $\leq$  has a last element. It has no negation in FI as the negation does not have a finite model.

The finite submodel property of FI would remain even if we allowed any  $\Delta_2$  formula  $\theta$  to occur in  $//_{\theta}$ . However, allowing  $\exists \forall$ -formulas  $\theta$  leads us to new avenues: Let  $FI(\exists \forall)$  be this generalization.

**Theorem 13.** *FI( $\exists \forall$ ) does not have the finite model property.*

**Proof.** Let  $\varphi$  be the sentence

$$(\forall x //) (\exists y //_{\psi(x)}) (y \neq x)$$

where  $\psi(x)$  is the  $\exists \forall$ -formula

$$x = 0 \vee (\exists u)(\forall v)(v \leq u).$$

The vocabulary consists of  $\leq$  and the constant 0. Let  $\varphi'$  be the conjunction of  $\varphi$  and the universal (hence FI) axioms of linear order.

**Claim 1.**  $\langle \omega, \leq, 0 \rangle \models \varphi'$ . The task of  $\exists$  is to choose  $y \neq x$  knowing only whether  $\psi(x)$  is true or not. She argues as follows: if I am told  $\psi(x)$  is true, I know it is because  $x = 0$ , so I choose  $y = 1$ . If, on the other hand, I am told that  $\psi(x)$  is not true, I know  $x \neq 0$ , so I choose  $y = 0$ .

**Claim 2.**  $\varphi'$  has no finite models. Suppose  $\mathfrak{A} = \langle A, \leq, 0 \rangle$  were one. Now  $\psi(x)$  is true independently of  $x$ . So  $\exists$  has no way of choosing  $y \neq x$  on the basis of whether  $\psi(x)$  is true or not. More formally, suppose  $\mathfrak{A} \models_X \varphi'$ , where  $X = \{\emptyset\}$ . Then  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X[A; x]} (\exists y //_{\psi(x)}) (y \neq x)$ . Let  $X[A : x] = X_0 \cup X_1$  be a  $\psi(x)$ -homogeneous partition and  $a_0, a_1 \in A$  such that  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0[a_0; y]} y \neq x$  and  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_1[a_1; y]} y \neq x$ . Since  $\psi(x)$  is always true,  $X_0 = \emptyset$  or  $X_1 = \emptyset$ . Say  $X_1 = \emptyset$ . Thus  $\langle x, a_0 \rangle \in X_0$ , whence  $\mathfrak{A} \models_{X_0[a_0; y]} y = x$ , a contradiction.  $\square$

Let  $FI(IF)$  denote the extension of FI where any  $\theta$  from IF-logic is allowed to occur in  $//_{\theta}$ . We know that non-well-foundedness can be expressed in the IF-logic. Lemma 2 implies that  $FI(IF)$  can express also well-foundedness. Thus  $FI(IF)$  is not included in IF-logic.

## 5. Reduction to first-order logic

The FI as we have defined it turns out to be translatable into first-order logic:

**Theorem 14.** *Every FI-sentence is equivalent to an  $\exists\forall$ -sentence and, vice versa, every  $\exists\forall$ -sentence is equivalent to an FI-sentence.*

**Proof.** One direction ( $\text{FI} \mapsto \exists\forall$ ) follows from [Theorem 11](#) and condition (3) of [Lemma 10](#). For the converse implication it suffices to notice that the following are equivalent:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{A} \models (\exists x_1) \dots (\exists x_n)(\forall y_1) \dots (\forall y_m)\varphi \\ \mathfrak{A} \models_{\{\emptyset\}} (\exists x_1 //) \dots (\exists x_n //)(\forall y_1 //) \dots (\forall y_m //)\varphi', \end{aligned}$$

where  $\varphi'$  is obtained from  $\varphi$  by replacing each disjunction  $\theta(\vec{x}) \vee \psi(\vec{x})$  by  $\theta(\vec{x}) \vee //_{\theta(\vec{x}), \psi(\vec{x})} \psi(\vec{x})$ . Note that  $\phi$  is quantifier-free, so its subformulas can occur in connection with  $//$ .  $\square$

**Theorem 15.** *FI has an exponential compression relative to first-order  $\exists\forall$  logic.*

**Proof.** Consider the structure  $\mathfrak{A}$  whose domain consists of all binary numerals. The predicate  $C(x, y)$  means that  $y = x + 1 \pmod{2^n}$ . Of course  $0 \leq y < 2^n$ . The predicate  $P_i(x)$  for  $i \leq n$  means that the  $i$ -th digit of  $x$  from the right is 1. Consider the formula  $\theta = (\forall x)(\exists y //_{P_1(x), \dots, P_n(x)} C(x, y))$ . The formula says that  $\exists$  can choose  $y$  knowing only the truth values of  $P_i(x) : i \leq n$ .  $\theta$  is true in  $\mathfrak{A}$ , and remains true if we only take integers  $< 2^n$ . But it is not true in any (non-empty) substructure of size  $< 2^n$ . Such a substructure will always contain an  $x$  such that *the*  $y$  such that  $C(x, y)$  is missing. Thus any  $\exists\forall$  formula which was equivalent to  $\theta$  would have to have at least  $2^n$  quantifiers.  $\square$

However, note that if we use full first-order logic to express  $\theta$  we do not need exponential growth. This is because the formula  $\phi = (\forall x)(\exists y)(\forall z)([\bigwedge_{i \leq n} P_i(x) \leftrightarrow P_i(z)] \rightarrow C(z, y))$  is equivalent to  $\theta$ . Intuitively, if  $\forall$  is allowed to *change* his move (from  $x$  to  $z$ ) *after*  $\exists$  has played hers, but satisfying the same Booleans, then she is in effect restricted to what she could have done had she known *only* the values of the Booleans.

We now show that every model of a FI-formula has a finite submodel of at most exponential size.

**Theorem 16.** *Let  $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi$  where the logical complexity of  $\varphi$  is  $n$ . Then  $\mathfrak{A}$  has a submodel  $\mathfrak{B}$  of  $\varphi$  of size at most  $n2^n$ .*

**Proof.** Assume that  $\varphi$  is written so that all negations apply only to atoms, so that  $\varphi$  is constructed from literals using  $\exists, \forall, \vee, \wedge$  only. For simplicity we assume that the  $\varphi$  in  $//\varphi$  is a combination of Booleans, although a more complex argument would remove this assumption. Eloise has a winning strategy for the game corresponding to  $\varphi$ . For each move  $\exists y$  of Eloise, consider the moves  $\forall x //_{P(x)}$  in whose scope  $y$  lies. There are at most  $n$  of such predicates  $P(x)$  and the value of  $y$  is determined by the truth values of these  $P(x)$ . ( $y$  may be determined also by previous moves  $y'$  of Eloise, but these are also determined by these Booleans  $P$  and therefore by *all* Booleans, whether  $y$  is in their scope or not.) So consider the set  $\mathcal{V}$  of all Boolean vectors governing *any* move of Eloise. The cardinality of  $\mathcal{V}$  is at most  $2^n$ . For each move  $\exists y_i$  of Eloise, her strategy gives a function  $f_i$  from  $\mathcal{V}$  into  $A$ ,

the domain of  $\mathfrak{A}$ . Since Eloise has at most  $n$  moves, there are at most  $n$  functions, and the range of all these functions gives us a subset of  $A$  of size at most  $n2^n$ . Let this subset be  $B$ .

Consider the modified game where Abelard is allowed to move in  $A$  but Eloise is restricted to moving in  $B$ . Clearly Eloise is free to use her former winning strategy and wins. Consider now a further restriction where Abelard is also restricted to  $B$ . Certainly this does not harm Eloise and she still wins. But that means that if  $\mathfrak{B}$  is the submodel corresponding to  $B$ , its size is at most  $n2^n$  and  $\mathfrak{B} \models \varphi$ .  $\square$

This result does not necessarily imply an exponential translation of FI-logic into  $\exists\forall$  logic. For consider an arbitrary formula  $\theta$  of first-order logic. If the formula  $\phi = \theta \vee (\exists x)(\forall y)(x = y)$  is true in some model, then there is a one-element submodel satisfying  $\phi$ . But we would not therefore expect a translation of  $\phi$  into an  $\exists\forall$  formula. However, intuitively such a translation of FI-logic does seem highly likely.

*Further work.* While we have carried out a certain amount of investigation of FI-logic and its semantics, the question of proof theory remains. As we already mentioned, we could also consider non-classical semantics, imposing restrictions on both Eloise's knowledge and Abelard's knowledge.

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